Cloud FPGAs have been gaining interest in recent years due to the ability of users to request FPGA resources quickly, flexibly, and on-demand. In addition to the existing single-tenant deployments, where each user gets an access to a whole FPGA, recent academic proposals have looked at creating multi-tenant deployments, where multiple users share a single FPGA, e.g., [3] . In both settings, there is a large amount of infrastructure and physical resources that are shared among users. Sharing of the physical resources in data centers and processors is well known to lead to potential attacks, e.g., [4] . However, only recently have there been demonstrations of various security attacks that our group and others have shown to be possible in Cloud FPGA setting, e.g., [5] .
In light of the attacks and defenses, Cloud FPGA security remains a cat-and-mouse game. There is then the foremost need to better understand the existing and potential attacks -to design defenses and deploy them before malicious users try to launch such attacks. Only with proper understanding of the possible FPGA attacks, can secure Cloud FPGAs be created. 
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